Emotions and the Transformative Potential of Fieldwork: Some Implications for Teaching and Learning Anthropology

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Abstract
In this article, I argue that the transformative learning potential of anthropology can be achieved only if emotions of anthropologists in the field are understood, articulated and added to the mainstream strengths of our qualitative method. This requires: turning our attention to emotions in research and learning; liberating emotions from the “extraordinary,” “apolitical” and “feminine”; understanding the emotional practices and regimes of our discipline and how they shape knowledge production; and, adding emotional reflexivity to the reflexive project of anthropology. I discuss some psychological defences evident in anthropological work that may be supported by academic practices, and several examples from published anthropological self-reflection, which look at the practical implications of emotions on methodology and analysis. I focus on accounts by two doctoral researchers to demonstrate the crucial importance of emotional reflexivity in knowledge-making and in teaching and learning anthropology, particularly fieldwork. I conclude by raising pedagogical questions and making some tentative practical suggestions for the teaching and learning of anthropological fieldwork.

Introduction
If doing doctoral fieldwork in anthropology is a personally and professionally transformative process, how do doctoral students prepare to experience and articulate it? To what extent do they recognise it as integral part of anthropological knowledge-making? Could such transformations form part of the wider goals of transformative learning (Taylor 2009) – where values change through knowledge practices and with them, one’s immediate social context changes - potentially adding to broader agendas of social transformation?

Many anthropologists have reported transforming experiences and events from their first long-term fieldwork (all being affective as well as intellectual), but hardly any have received formal preparation to engage with affect and its role in meaning making. Is this lack of formal preparation for bodily experiencing and making sense of Self in a process of knowing-in-relatedness significant? Could it affect the authority of anthropology and does it enhance or limit anthropology’s potential as transformative learning? Should we pay attention to it? Should we adjust the way we teach anthropology to postgraduates and undergraduates, or even in schools - to take into account the role of emotions in the development of method and theory?

While anthropologists gain knowledge in the field through lived, embodied experience and engagement - in relationship to people, things, states, institutions or the environment - most often preparation for
doctoral fieldwork consists chiefly of acquiring knowledge about the history and current affairs of the region, or the concepts (they would focus on) and the existing scholarly or political debates in their field. One might even go so far as to suggest that anthropologists arrive at their first fieldwork site somewhat ready to engage in a relationship (that is, an ongoing intellectual debate) with those they have already read (that is, other anthropologists) rather than with their own affective world. That will inevitably shape and filter their fieldwork engagements, data collection and analysis.

In this paper, I suggest that the transformative potential of anthropology (both in terms of a personal and professional journey and a social and cultural critique) can be achieved only if the individual transformative experiences of anthropologists in the field are understood and fruitfully articulated, and formally added to the strengths of our qualitative method. The transformations during anthropological fieldwork are affective experiences and the knowledge we gain and share in the field is affective as well as cognitive. When ignored, such understanding may affect, firstly, the quality of the engagement through which we produce knowledge and, consequently secondly, the quality of knowledge itself. This, in turn, poses classic anthropological questions: what do we do to make knowledge in practice and what do we think and say we do to others and to ourselves? In order to reveal how crucial the role of emotions may be in anthropological knowledge-making, I draw on self-reflective accounts by doctoral researchers and additional published experiences of other anthropologists. I show that individual anthropologists may develop their emotional reflexivity either within or outside anthropology but when they apply it to their research, they would always arrive at enhanced anthropological knowledge. Here, we may also need to re-consider what we see as “knowledge” (see e.g. “emotions as knowledge” in Lorimer 2010, Luhrmann 2010, Lindquist 2010, Braddock 2010, Hastrup 2010, Hage 2010).

The five sections of the article represent five steps towards developing emotional reflexivity in order to achieve transformative learning; in practice, however, they do not have to follow in the same order. The first step is to turn our attention towards our emotions in the field. Here, we can rely on existing anthropological achievements in research, teaching and learning and we could also draw on some educational research. The second step is to “liberate” emotions from some dominant but unhelpful discourses about them being “extraordinary,” “feminine” or “apolitical.” The third step is to examine the emotional regimes of academia as a whole, of anthropology as a discipline, in particular, and of our individual institutions and their consequences. In this third step, I discuss various examples of anthropological emotional practices, including some psychological defences that may be at play. The fourth step is about articulating our own emotional processes that form part of knowledge-making - and I focus in more detail on two case-studies of doctoral experiences, which show how important emotional reflexivity is for both theory and method in anthropology. I then conclude with the fifth step - designing strategies to include emotional reflexivity in our pedagogy towards transformative learning and teaching. If the vision of teaching anthropology sometimes aligns with the vision of transformative learning, we may have to consider additional ways of preparing doctoral students for making sense of affects during fieldwork. This may require different teaching and learning strategies even at an earlier stage – in schools or among undergraduates.

**Step 1: Turning Attention to Emotions in Anthropology**

Learning anthropology could be conceived as a constantly emergent, transformative process of knowing, doing and being (Coleman and Simpson 2004). At times, the discipline has experienced tectonic shifts - such as during the 1970s and 1980s - when anthropology engaged with social, cultural and political critique. These shifts have undoubtedly impacted on teaching and learning. Since then, anthropology has often been thought of as a discipline offering social and cultural critique and, in this sense, it is a fertile field for transformative learning contributing towards both personal and social change. Once again, anthropology is engaged in epistemological, ontological and methodological shifts, as is evident from the discussions in Faubion and Marcus (2009), Rabinow et al. (2008) in particular. More importantly, such shifts require a re-design of the existing pedagogical practices of the discipline, and
the potential pedagogical shifts (as Marcus 2009 argues) could be the very enablers of the contemporary innovations in anthropology as a discipline. Anthropology today requires an explicit elaboration of a context-specific transformative pedagogy that allows the next generation of anthropologists to innovate while carrying on the key accomplishments of past generations.

Coleman and Simpson (p. 20) argue that it is the “imaginist” approach that could lead to a “radical rethink of the content and pedagogical strategies of anthropology” - anthropology is often a journey of transforming simultaneously “knowing, being and doing.” Such a journey of transformation resonates with some of the goals of transformative learning developed in educational research. Originally formulated by the educational researcher Mezirow (1978) in the context of adult learning, transformative learning refers more generally to what Quinnan (1997: 42, cited in Taylor 2009:3) describes as: “the process by which students are challenged to assess their own worldview and values and then change by this experience.” This describes well what many anthropologists experience in the process of fieldwork and what often happens in the process of learning anthropology in general: constant challenges to “the Self” emerge through encountering the ongoing different ways of knowing, being and doing, together with the effort to understand, engage and empathise with “the Other” and to make sense of and articulate these encounters both personally and academically.

These challenges to the Self may often lead to new ways of knowing, being and doing. These could sometimes entail “identity disturbances” as described by the proponents of transformative learning theory. In anthropology, a good example is offered by Djohari (2011) who describes how in development studies students become painfully disillusioned about their professional careers in international development, as a result of taking a course in anthropology which critiques development practice. Such transformations are not always as painful or confusing as described by Djohari but they often lead to changing one’s previous ways of knowing, being and doing, at times, radically. By discussing published accounts about experiences involving elements of transformative learning, I draw attention to its significance for the individual researcher as well as for the discipline and its pedagogy. Individual accounts by doctoral students in anthropology (both the published ones discussed in this article, and those from numerous informal conversations) point to areas where the full potential of transformative learning is prevented by certain regimes of anthropology and its pedagogy, and sometimes by the individuals themselves.

Transformative learning may occur in various areas of anthropological practice but, here, I focus mainly on processes occurring during doctoral fieldwork - perhaps the most obvious site of personal and professional transformation in anthropology, often referred to as our “rite of passage.” Until the publication of two recent volumes on emotions in fieldwork (Spencer and Davies 2010 and Davies and Spencer 2010), there has been little mainstream debate about anthropology as an affective as well as intellectual enterprise. Similarly to taking for granted the affective encounters in the field, anthropologists may be taking for granted the affective teaching and learning practices in seminar rooms, lecture theatres and supervisory relationships.

Articulating emotions as part of the lived experience of research, learning and teaching can offer insights into the encounters not only of fieldwork but those of the classroom too - as ethnographic encounters. That is, we need to include emotional reflexivity in both teaching and learning as well as in fieldwork research. Despite the dominance of self-reflexive anthropology today, the way anthropologists gain knowledge through lived experience in anthropological fieldwork has remained somewhat black-boxed - and this is what is mirrored in its teaching, particularly with regard to the role of anthropologists’ emotions. Transformative learning is an affective process and emotions daily permeate anthropological research, teaching and learning. This is of relevance to all levels of teaching anthropology – be it at pre-university, undergraduate or post-graduate level. The embodied experiences of conducting doctoral fieldwork and their impact on anthropologists themselves, on the people we work with in the field and on the discipline – can only fully be understood if we add emotional reflexivity to the wider reflexive project of anthropology.
However, anthropology doctoral courses (anywhere in the world), have few – if any at all – formal spaces (e.g. a course, a discussion group) for students to engage with the psychology and anthropology of lived fieldwork experience and its relevance to knowledge creation.\textsuperscript{xv} It is clear that certain states or ways of being lead to certain ways of knowing. Which ones are supported by our teaching and to what effect? It is still the case, that the first year of doctoral training in anthropology in the UK, principally requires the accumulation of cognitive knowledge – a familiarity with the region of choice and the specific theoretical concepts of the chosen topic of study. This is despite the fact that everybody expects the novice anthropologist to also undergo certain transformative processes in the field through lived experience.

Fieldwork methodology courses tend to dwell on formal techniques for data collection such as sampling, surveys and interviewing; and more recently, on statistics, on standardized ethical guideline checklists or safety. Students are also advised to read and discuss ethnographic monographs but mainly from the viewpoint of concepts, theories and the interpretation of data. The messy sides of lived fieldwork experience, encounters and relationships, through which we gain knowledge, are rarely discussed in classes prior to fieldwork and they are not always fruitfully discussed after fieldwork (as is evident from the case studies below). Students taking medical or feminist anthropology courses tend to come in contact more often with readings and discussions on “lived experience” or “affect.” This tends not to be the case with, for example, anthropologists of migration or economic anthropologists. Students talk about their fieldwork experiences in informal spaces such as the pub after class, or at dinner parties. They conduct their conversations “in private.” As much as such informal spaces create heartfelt experiences and the atmosphere of camaraderie is a source of inspiration and validation of fieldwork joys and struggles - is this always a fruitful articulation of fieldwork experiences? Furthermore, “corridor” discussions of our experiential methods of gaining knowledge, as noticed by many anthropologists, may continue to undermine some of the key strengths of our discipline as a whole. If fieldwork is, or could be a transformative experience, what does it actually entail and how can it be taught and learnt to sustain the authority of our discipline? What pedagogical strategies do we employ to ensure that the novice fieldworker works to their full potential and with integrity, aware of the implications of their affective work on themselves, on people in the field and on anthropology?

I have experienced becoming and being an anthropologist, learning and teaching anthropology as an enriching and fulfilling (both personally and professionally) transformative process. It has been a very challenging process. So, I argue here for expanding further the transformative potential of anthropological training through deliberate focus on the emotions of anthropologists in the course of doctoral fieldwork. As I explain in the next section, this may have to begin from within anthropology – with mainstream liberation of the emotional in anthropology from the “extraordinary,” the “apolitical” and the “feminine.”\textsuperscript{xvi} The aim could be to show how attention to anthropologists’ emotions in fieldwork (and more generally to embodied experience) may sometimes be decisive with respect to what type of knowledge we are able to access, and that this has methodological, theoretical, experiential, and ethical implications. Further, I include a brief discussion of certain pedagogical or research practices and the stories we tell ourselves and others, which might have implications for how we experience and produce anthropology bodily and psychologically, as well as intellectually. That is, certain social practices (and, in particular, anthropological practices) may create or sustain particular internal states-of-being of anthropologists which are of consequence to our discipline as well as to the individual anthropologist.\textsuperscript{xvii} The emotional could be integrated as a vehicle of knowing into established areas of anthropological enquiry and once embraced it could open new areas for research as well as new interfaces between anthropology and other disciplines.

In this context, Tanya Luhrmann’s (2010) proposal to add the notion of proclivity to an earlier understanding of learning as an interpretive drift (1989) is also instructive. It points simultaneously to the role of institutions or discourses and to the individual’s proclivities (interest, motivation and bodily
Step 2: Liberating Emotions from the “Extraordinary,” the “Feminine” and the “Apolitical”

Anthropologists have sometimes unwittingly empowered themselves the rationalistic hegemonies about fieldwork by labelling what we actually do as being “unacceptable,” “eccentric” or “exceptional.” Even those open to the emotional aspects of work might have fallen into this trap. For example, Goulet and Miller (2007) demonstrate the importance of emotions and embodied experience in anthropological work. However, they do so by unintentionally elevating them to an “extra-ordinary” status, when choosing how to name them in the title of their book: Extraordinary Anthropology. Transformations in the Field (this might also be the case for Young and Goulet and Miller’s volume of 1994: Being Changed: the Anthropology of Extraordinary Experience). While they fairly describe certain experiences as sufficiently unusual and unique to warrant the “extra-ordinary” appellation, many more common experiences and emotions they report are tainted with the same brush. By labelling common anthropological experiences as “extra-ordinary” we exclude them from the ordinary or everyday occurrences. How then, can we normalise for ourselves and others what we actually do?

Feminist research and the growing body of queer research has contributed enormously to coaxing emotions from the margins and the “extra-ordinary.” Jagger (1989) has clearly demonstrated how even the most ordinary emotions in fieldwork research can be a source of knowledge as well as a source of political and epistemological resistance. Indeed, feminist scholars have been among the pioneers in understanding the role of emotions, linking them to politics, historicising emotions and situating them in the intersections of culture and power. This is especially so since the call of Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990) and their insightful work on the way in which emotional discourses form part of power relations and maintain social hierarchies. Such work has enormous transformative potential. Stanley and Wise (1993:189) place emotion second on a list of seven characteristics that differentiate feminist research from “traditional” research. The differentiation between feminist and mainstream research has also served to entrap the emotional into the “insignificant” and “subsidiary,” due to specific circumstances of domination (the marginalisation of feminists as described below), or what Lutz (1990) describes as the ideological subordination of women by labelling them “the emotional gender” (see also Jagger 1989). Thus, while on the one hand, feminist scholars were working to acknowledge emotion, the conditions in which they were working meant that some of their contributions have remained marginalised, although they are of relevance to everyone. Understanding how this marginalisation occurred is important in order to avoid its further continuation but it lies outside the scope of this article.

It is regrettable that the male-analytical/female-emotional dichotomies have silenced certain possibilities for integration, and for understanding how central emotions are not just to data gathering but also theory-making for both men and women. Certain dichotomies, which debilitating and fracture research, solidify the place of the emotional as “private.” Judith Okely (1975:174) has spoken of these dichotomies eloquently (see also Moore 1994):

…the specific is described as ‘hard,’ scientific and objective fact, its opposite is ‘airy fairy’ speculation, emotional and soft – woman’s domain… fact is equated with ‘vulgar empiricism’ and its opposite is theory, women are seen to be the fact gatherers and men are the theoreticians… Whatever ‘female thought’ may be, it is the one that is undervalued.

As Michael Jackson has reminded us (1989:186), such dichotomies crumble and blend in the face of actual lived experience, for experience breaks the confines of “the orthodox discursive styles,” and furthermore refuses “to recognise any essential division between ethnographic experience and other modes of experience, personal, ethical or political”. As Jackson (2010) also argues, we cannot explore the emotional as though it were a “personal” and detached entity, a product of a bounded “self,” for it is formed within the interpersonal, political and transpersonal realms. We could also explore more
systematically how the use of the emotional can be itself a political tool in that it can challenge dominant modes of knowing, and through this, dominant socio-political orders. In the meantime, turning towards feminist research and integrating some of its findings in mainstream anthropology may be a decisive step forward – provided that such a step is not marginalised in the same manner as some feminist contributions have been.

In addition to feminist research, the analysis of emotions as having a political capacity has also had significant achievement in anthropology as well as in other disciplines. There is indeed a growing variety of approaches in different strands of anthropology to understanding the relationship between emotions and politics. Navaro-Yashin (2002), Arexaga (2003), Mahler (2006), Milton and Svašek (2005), Biehl et al. (2009) suggest that to have a genuine understanding of the political, anthropologists must develop methods particular to the experiential specifics of politics while examining how the emotional forms part of the political. If this work is convincing about the integral part of emotions within the political among people we study, and if we assume that anthropology as a discipline forms part of political discourses, what would we gain if we were to turn our research attention to anthropologists themselves in a similar fashion?

There is already an insightful even if still rather young discussion to draw on further, showing how we could understand the affective fieldwork practices of anthropologists in knowledge-making, and the constructions, consequences and experiences of anthropological “multi-sited fieldwork,” morality or power. This discussion includes among others: the practices of “implication” and “intensification” (Hage 2003) and “ethnographic vacillation” (Hage, 2010); immersion in political crisis and amnesia (Hsu 2010); engagement (Smith and Kleinman 2010); fear and postsocialism (Lindquist 2010); migrant nostalgia, abjection and the myth of return (Ewing 2005); “selfscape dreams” (Hollan 2005); “cultural models of time” (Birth 2005); and migration and globalisation (Svašek and Skrbis 2007). In addition, Hage (2010), Hsu (2010), Smith and Kleinman (2010), Lindquist (2010) and Crapanzano (2010), explore the political through the researcher’s emotional investments and involvements, showing how the emotional (and with it our knowledge) arises with the political within the experience of relatedness in the field.

In certain cases, only by sensing it in our lived field experiences could we grasp the political and know how people, things, space, events, or other aspects are implicated in it; that is how the emotional, the relational and the political constitute each other. Such research undermines the “field” as a geographical site and reveals it as an embodied relational process – an actual aspect of our relatedness in practice, spread as far as our psychological and bodily capacity for relatedness and for reflecting on this relatedness. And, as Ghassan Hage (2010), and Maruska Svašek (2010) demonstrate, it is emotionally imagined as well as experienced. If first year doctoral students prepare for the field as a geographical site (even if multi-sited) – they would have to read one set of readings and the cognitive preparation may be sufficient. If they prepare for the field as what it is - a lived relational, bodily and psychological process, occurring as much on the outside as on the inside of the anthropologist, and between the anthropologist and their research participants, their lecturers, peers, the discipline and others, then doctoral preparation may require a different set of readings – such as those above; and a different pedagogy. The preparation then will be not for participant observation but for relational reflection. However, such reconceptualization of the field and of doing fieldwork requires understanding of the emotional regimes of academia and I turn to some of their practices next.

Step 3: Understanding Certain Professional Practices as Defences

If the experiential (in terms of embodied fieldwork experiences) is such a fruitful intellectual territory, both male and female, ordinary and extraordinary, and political throughout, how is it that emotions continue to remain on the margins of discourse about anthropological knowledge practices despite all the work done so far? In two recent edited volumes, we have summarised some of the key reasons highlighted by numerous scholars. We discuss in particular, a number of processes including the history
of academic research since the Enlightenment, traditional versus radical empiricism, the history of anthropology as a discipline and of fieldwork methodology in particular, the emotional regimes of academia, various teaching challenges, the ideology of individualism permeating both our methodological thinking and the articulation of certain bodily experiences, and precluding acknowledgement of the relational nature of anthropological work and of teaching and learning among others.

In this section, I draw attention to some experiential/relational dynamics. They are related to our internalised professional expectations and are co-created with and sustained by particular social, institutional and political practices of anthropology. Such dynamics are at play in widespread methodological or analytical practices and may have moral and ethical implications of varying significance. I suggest that we may be continuing to prevent ourselves from emotional awareness through such practices when employing them as various defences against looking into our embodied experiences. I will focus on guilt and cynicism. I discuss such experiences by adding also a psychological defence framework in order to stress that professional practices are embodied relational experiences. Thus, understanding and finding ways to overcome unhelpful professional defences may necessitate removing certain psychological defences - to enhance learning and research. Such is the proposition in psychoanalytic research (e.g. Antonocoupulu and Gabriel 2001): to learn, we have to overcome the psychological resistances involved. The latter are often seen to stem from perceived (often unconscious) dangers to our identity, or that of the group. Such relational dangers, potentially resonating with earlier experiences, evoke strong feelings, e.g. fear or anxiety, and are thus fended off through various psychological and practical defences. How, then, do our daily taken-for-granted practices (e.g. teaching in a class or a seminar, applying methods in the field), which are felt and sensed, internalised and embodied, motivate and empower learning or impede it? Our learning and teaching practices shape not only what we think is right anthropologically but also what “feels right” anthropologically, that is - our anthropological sensibility, thinking through feeling; our internal (relational) experiences, including our capacity for learning, have their counterparts in our professional (relational) practices. In order to liberate the potential for transformative learning, we may have to examine and, possibly, undo certain professional practices (which we come to embody) that hold us back.

Such discussion draws to some extent on the work of Georges Devereux (1967) who convincingly shows the important role of researchers’ psychology in their work and, in particular, the use of methods - as a psychological defence. I also draw on the work of Lurhmann (1989, 2001), Sinclair (1997) and Davies (2009) on the “making” of various professionals through respective trainings. Some of that work shows indeed how the internal (psychological) experience is co-created with social practices and the specific conditions of research and training. Lurhmann (2010) demonstrates clearly that individual proclivities (motivation, interest, willingness, and bodily capacity) define the direction and scope of research, at the same time as the internalisation (that is, embodiment) of professional practice through learning transforms one’s capacity (both intellectually and bodily) to engage with method and theory. In our case, that would mean that the types of training we have will encourage some and discourage other states and ways of being. In this context, it is worth asking how certain forms of professional socialisation and daily anthropological practices may be produced together with the embodied experience of anthropologists? This professional, social and psychological, concert may in turn have methodological and theoretical implications.

When I discuss defensive professional practices, I suggest that they may potentially be related to (e.g. reinforce) respective psychological defences (of various degrees of awareness). Suppression of emotions and compartmentalising of experience are widespread and they are not specific to anthropology. They may be recognised in different guises in many anthropological accounts of fieldwork, in daily professional or informal conversations, during routines of university life and at special academic events such as conferences. These defences, similarly to other embodied relational practices, are supported and sometimes even promoted by the existing emotional regimes of academia,
by daily anthropological practices and professional (research, teaching or peer) relationships, including writing (which is a relational practice too), and, also fieldwork training programmes (what we teach and how). They form an integral part to how we practice, learn and teach anthropology and how we experience and articulate it. They defend us against what is unacceptable professionally (which has a personal dimension too – especially when considering the personal transformations involved in learning anthropology). These embodied forces of our work are indivisible from personal, intellectual, political and ethical concerns. They involve a multitude of emotional (including moral) trajectories. But the abundant literature on ethnographic methods, most of which does provide advice on how to “manage” or “control” emotions of different kinds in the field (sometimes usefully), rarely provides examples on how to analyse the complexities of emotional relational engagements (such as the psychological processes involved) – see, for example, DeWalt and DeWalt 2002 (and the critical discussion of such literature in Curran 2010). “Managing” and “controlling” is a way to keep the defences intact and prevents us from understanding emotions and their role in producing knowledge and from articulating how we feel. Like all other professionals, anthropologists have certain ways in which they sometimes inhibit and, at other times allow, emotional potential for engagement and knowing as individuals or collectively.

Guilt

Most anthropologists would agree that this disclosure from a doctoral student exemplifies a familiar scene:

I always want to defend my discipline from the accusation that we exploit “the other”, but then I was under so much pressure to gather data in a short period of time, that pragmatism occasionally took over. I feel guilty as I may have sometimes taken more from my field relationships than I have given back. (Doctoral student 2007)

In such context, anthropologists may be prone to guilt, which can be either fully experienced (thus producing direct field responses and engagement) or to some degree repressed (and leading to various forms of disengagement or adapted behaviours). The “repressed” may “return” and its effects may limit our field (and understanding of it) by foreclosing, ignoring or transforming the relationships involved. This alters both the quality of our engagement and the quality of our data and analysis. Guilt may have several different faces. Sometimes, it could stimulate an active engagement, and the student might redirect this energy to meaningful actions. For example, Smith and Kleinman (2010) describe how their personal experiences of guilt, painful to examine and experience, were productively transformed into acknowledgement and advocacy. Even then, the authors note that is still “a kind of tragic practice – a human engagement that can be painful yet fulfilling, limited yet nevertheless the best way forward, imperative as it remains, like all action, laden with unintended consequences” (p.185-186).

Indeed, numerous anthropologists, including me, have become involved in NGOs during or after their fieldwork, or have attempted to reciprocate the hospitality and generosity of local people in various ways. The exploration of the feeling of guilt and frustration that sometimes propels such action is important as Smith and Kleinman show: the moral dilemmas, arising from the transformation of guilt into engagement, need moral courage in order to be resolved in a humanistic fashion and with awareness such that people can act as a matter of choice. Acting compulsively, while producing at first sight morally elevated results, does not resolve the complexities of engagement and may prevent us from understanding the way field relationships are implicated (and with them – our knowledge). We are yet to explore the variety of mechanisms - political, psychological and methodological - in the production and impact of fieldwork guilt and doubt and their moral consequences. “Engagement is both ethically required and morally complicated” conclude Smith and Kleinman (p.183) and concur with Emmanuel Levinas that it cannot be separated from analysis, it is a part of an “interhuman recognition” (pp. 173-174).

Another face of guilt and an ensuing “condescension” rather than a recognition of “the Other” emerges from the warning of Dominguez (2000) regarding the danger of anthropological oscillation
between disengagement and idealization of people in the field as a result of our “politics of correction” – the guilt from our geo-politically defined position. She sees that our guilt and pity result in treating the people with “kid gloves both in the field and in our writings” (p.136). Instead, Dominguez (p. 365) invites us to stop the silence and the condescension and proposes a “politics of love”:

…based on a different criterion of value – namely, genuine love, respect, and affection, not categorical ‘identity’ […] the kind of love we feel for family members, tough love at times but never disengagement or hagiography. Love – the thing most of us are not open about in our scholarly writing, the kind most of us have been professionally socialised into excising from our scholarly writing.

Jackson (1998) also calls for an authentic engagement in the field, which is endorsed by radical empiricism. The transformative agenda from this point of view is a humanising one – it is about achieving deep mutual understanding rather than acting out various fantasies, and repressed or script behaviours of anthropology such as “rescuing”:

… the task of ethnography is not to know the Other in any final sense nor even to know the self through the other. Nor is it to change the lives of others, or even critique one’s own culture. Its warrant lies in its power to describe in depth and detail the dynamics of intersubjective life under a variety of cultural conditions in the hope that one may thereby be led to an understanding of how these rare moments of erasure and effacement occur when self and other are constituted in mutuality and acceptance rather than violence and contempt. (p. 208)

Such goals for anthropology would challenge the morality of acting on the wings of one’s guilt without a deep emotional insight revealing the humanising potential of affective participation. Thus, an important aspect in fieldwork training methods may be the discussion of moral emotions such as guilt arising during fieldwork, and their consequences for the fieldworker and people in the field. How could such emotions be transformed into engagement rather than disengagement and what values and knowledge are at stake? What are the dilemmas producing these moral emotions and how do they inform the process of knowing?

In pre-fieldwork training, students’ susceptibilities to emotional rules are more pronounced – students learn to respect, practice and embody certain norms and ways of being. They learn how to think about fieldwork, what to expect, and what would be “right” or “wrong” methodological things to do in the field. Later on, the newly acquired norms and ways of being will somewhat shape the way they experience and articulate fieldwork. Once internalised, these norms are protected by emotions such as guilt and doubt, and activated when the norms are transgressed. Another face of guilt is eloquently described by Joanna Cook (2010). Her guilt about defying her institutionally incorporated ideas about the “correct” field procedure, aroused in her a sub-set of field emotions (including anxiety and doubt), which were more responses to her own internalised expectations than to the immediate field situation. What the anthropologist does in such situations is crucial with respect to the knowledge produced. Cook resisted these expectations to good effect, but the question remains: in what way do internalised methodological and other professional expectations and embodied standards come to limit what we are able to experience in the field, and, assuming that reflection upon experience is informative, what can we ultimately come to know?

Compartmentalisation and Cynicism

Compartmentalising the Self, here refers to cleavages between different states of being (disconnected in awareness in various degrees; some could even indicate the unconscious psychological defence of splitting). For example, we may compartmentalise ourselves between a “reasonable self” and a “feeling self” or between feeling and acting one way in one place, and rather differently in another with no evident reason for such disparity. These cleavages may be supported by certain social and professional practices segregating “good” from “bad,” or “desirable” from “undesirable” ways of being and behaving, or organising different spaces for being to act in different ways. In anthropology, such practices may include a split between what is deemed “professional” and what is “personal,” or the perception of being “there” (in the field) and being “here” as disconnected. The latter has been
experienced or noticed by many anthropologists, and it has many guises. These compartments are not just about different sites for different appropriate behaviours but involve particular ways of being, which we tend to sustain as separate because of various norms of “good anthropological practice” (whose breach may be fear-invoking, and seen as some form of danger).

For example, I attended a fascinating presentation on ritual at a conference workshop on healing practices. The presenter, who had obtained what he felt to be his richest data through reflecting upon his experiences in ritual, felt it dangerous (as he admitted later on) to mention this in the “official” domains of his textual and seminar performance. I observed him in one state of being during his presentation at the conference workshop – an embodiment of “academic reason” and “intellectual rigour,” including contained, “professional” body language of an experienced presenter and skilful use of slides. Then, in the coffee break following the workshop, the speaker suddenly became quite a different man. A few people, including me, were eager to talk to him more about fieldwork methodology and how he gained his insights in the field. So, in a way, he gave us a second, completely different presentation over coffee – that of his lived experience of gathering data and making sense of it. The measured academic was gone and we now listened to a loud, vigorous, passionate, excited person – his entire being was talking about his work in the field and how he had gained his insights experientially. His calm academic tone of the workshop was replaced by the passion that had marked his fieldwork participation in that particular ritual and had given him the key to understanding it. I wished he had included his methodological discussion from the coffee break in the main presentation, but we all understood that he felt this was not acceptable and he may not have been taken seriously (he was also looking for a job). How strange then, that the main thing which helped him make sense of the data and gave authority to his work, is perceived as unwelcome on the formal stage of anthropological performance. What if I had not seen him in the coffee break? At the time, this confirmed to me (then - a student) that I should continue to keep things separate. He clearly did not plan to spend time looking for ways to articulate the links between his two states of being or to integrate them. At first sight, this story may seem just about a good professional decorum in a seminar room followed by a lively coffee break, but embodying and communicating methodology differently in different spaces - with no internal or social freedom of choice to make links between the two - goes far beyond the innocence of appropriate conference manners.

This embodied “compartmentalisation” of ourselves between two different but not necessarily contradictory versions of the field experience only helps maintain the boundary between them. In this way, we sustain the “scientific” image (and whose definition of “scientific” is this?) of our “professional” practice while we actually do something else in the field in order to acquire knowledge (and what we do is valuable). The emotional, the embodied, is excluded and its key contribution to knowledge remains hidden to ourselves but also to those outside anthropology. This poses significant questions about the teaching and learning of anthropology and how such splits in embodied knowledge may be reproduced in academic practices and their organisation into different spaces for different states of doing, being and knowing. Fieldwork emotions seem to have been allocated to the informal spaces such as the coffee break, the pub or dinner parties and the emotionally measured, theoretically analytical rather than affective accounts of fieldwork experiences are allocated to classes and conferences (except for the occasional fieldwork anecdotes, which is one of the few widely accepted spaces for revealing, or, performing the emotional in the field to an academic audience). Marjorie Mitchell (2010) reports another example from her fieldwork. She created a space for her emotional experiences in the field within her emails to friends and family while in the field site, thus distancing herself psychologically/bodily/methodologically from the field but also from the key to her analysis. She attempted to maintain what she was taught to be the “correct” way of being in the field. It was not until she was able to bridge the two that she arrived at an important insight about her field. She was then able to engage fully and, thus, understand her field more deeply.

These examples suggest that certain embodied defences parallel our knowledge-making practices and those may be mutually co-creating each other. The implications are not trivial. They may serve to
maintain false expectations and even fantasies about what fieldwork is and should be, what the anthropologist should be and should not be, and hence, what anthropology can be. Despite the existing awareness and efforts to integrate such embodied methodological cleavages, why do we continue to sustain such compartmentalisation both institutionally and informally, collectively and individually?

The fantasy in Lacanian terms\textsuperscript{xxviii} one may adhere to here, despite awareness (“I know that something is not true but I shall behave as if it were true despite my awareness.”) has been discussed as cynicism by Zizek (1995), Sloterdijk (1988) and more recently, for the context of public culture - by Navaro-Yashin (2002). In our case, it might take the form of professional anthropological, academic, cynicism. Zizek (p. 28-29, cf. Navaro-Yashin 2002) describes the ideology of cynicism and how one may partake in it to sustain it: “The cynical subject is quite aware of the distance between the ideological mask and the social reality, but he nonetheless still insists upon that mask…” as imagining getting free of this symptom may produce more anxiety than adhering to it.

It may be useful to problematise the notion of cynicism in order to highlight the effects of the occasions when we engage in fantasies and compartmentalisation. Is it the predicament of the “powerlessness” of our discipline that we anthropologists may have to a certain extent created ourselves here? Are we taking away from the strengths of anthropology when performing some “scientific” version of knowledge-making, even when we are aware that it is actually not “scientific” at the same time? Or, to what extent do our compartmentalising practices result from the maintenance of a fantasy that “we cannot do otherwise”, a fantasy that we are aware of and cannot escape for some important reason? To what extent may we be “caught in a hegemonic bind” here (Herzfeld 2007:96) and cannot, or must not step out? And, to what extent do we choose to stay in the fantasy because we do not know that we can leave it behind or do not know (and thus get anxious about) how to break out of it (e.g. we might simply lack skills in writing\textsuperscript{xxix}, reflection, emotional intelligence, sensitivity or something else)? It is our professional, political, ethical, moral and intellectual responsibility to examine closely our embodied methodological practices (which are always social and moral at the same time as being psychological and political) as they may have prevented us from properly analysing what is important and meaningful in the emotional and, thus, in the relational and moral process that we develop as fieldwork.

Harris (2007: 13) calls for opening the “black box” of “knowing how” (e.g. how we actually learn skills and come to perform them, how we actually acquire what Bourdieu refers to as habitus) in anthropology. This call in a way invites us to overcome various professional and possible related psychological defences in anthropological learning. We could address such questions in the hope that where possible and where our high professional standards, including our humanistic and intellectual responsibilities, call for it, we could integrate what we do with what we say we do through a valid and valuable way of knowing.\textsuperscript{xxx} I now turn towards some examples from doctoral research.

**Step 4: The Emotional Regimes of Anthropology and Individual Doctoral Learning**

In this section, I look at two additional examples of doctoral experiences with fieldwork (Heaton Shrestha 2010 and Curran 2010 – both fascinating, moving and profoundly insightful auto-ethnographies), to support the arguments developed above: that professional anthropological socialisation involves the acquisition of embodied knowledge, delimited by both individual proclivities and institution-specific or wider disciplinary ways of experiencing and understanding emotions; and that this socialisation is decisive in the way the field is experienced, understood and articulated in academic work. The examples are about student struggles with lack of support when making sense of fieldwork emotions during doctoral training. They call for finding better ways of articulating fruitfully the emotional to support knowledge-making with integrity. This is instead of acting defensively; instead of transforming emotions simply to meet the bureaucratic requirements of the doctorate and comply with certain, often dated, norms of being anthropological.
Returning from her doctoral fieldwork in Nepal, Heaton Shrestha (2010) describes how the daily practices in her department effect how she comes to understand, represent and analyse her fieldwork. She draws on Reddy’s work (2002) to illustrate how her field-data becomes subjected to and transformed by what he calls the academy’s “emotional regime” – namely, the complex set of practices which “establish a set of emotional norms and that sanction those who break them” (Reddy 2002: 129). Heaton Shrestha shows the effects of the academy’s “emotional regime” by analysing how the rawness of emotion during her fieldwork, contained in her field-notes, transforms. The mechanisms of this transformation are her experiences of specific academic practices and discourses, which find fertile soil in her own desire to “acquire legitimate meanings.” This is how the proclivity of the researcher meets matching institutional arrangements.

During her fieldwork with NGOs, she experienced a rich palette of emotions. Some of the most vivid emotions included vulnerability, powerlessness, loneliness, longing, pain, hardship, joy, antipathy, desire, caring, embarrassment, anger, and pride. After fieldwork, in the course of doctoral seminars and interactions with colleagues back home, aiming to succeed academically, she notices how she begins to reformulate her emotional experiences. She describes this as an intensification of emotional effects. For example, she begins to emphasise the marginalisation of NGO beneficiaries and the emotions related to it. Gradually, certain emotional experiences come to dominate her PhD thesis while others disappear. Cynicism, the legitimate anthropological emotion in NGO research within development studies at the time, takes over her written text as the “legitimate meaning”. As a result, new emotional tones enter her analysis and writing: emotions indexing her “powerful” position in the field replace emotions indicating sharing, and even experiences of “powerlessness” in the field; feelings of indebtedness come to deny her experiences of daily reciprocity in the field.

Her experience with field relatedness was also one of sharing, of mutuality and reciprocal involvement with the NGO staff, even in conflict. With the emotional intensification post-fieldwork, she begins to reposition herself. Attempting to fit within the academically appropriate emotion, this creates a hierarchy between her and the NGOs, where she gradually repositions herself as the powerful actor. All this reinterpretation of fieldwork experience from field-notes to thesis takes place through several different means. One example includes the readings she is recommended to help her make sense of her experience as a woman in the field. When she attempts to make sense of intense gendered feelings, she is advised by a supervisor to immerse in an ethnographic reading on the gendering of the national community. This reading supports a very specific articulation of fieldwork experience, not necessarily the one the student is looking for, but definitely one that the student might include in the thesis – as it is recommended by an authority figure. Other examples include the collegial and supervisory relationships and institutional arrangements and requirements. Among them, a striking example is the role of the seminar. She attempts to search for a way to articulate her emotions during the seminar discussions. Instead, she is criticised by her peers for bringing feelings forward, she is almost deemed incompetent in self-reflection and receives guidance for “appropriate reflexivity” - excluding her emotions. She receives a commentary and not a dialogue, and her classmates use the instrument of humour, which discourages her from searching further for an alternative articulation of her intense and unresolved feelings (which are methodologically, theoretically and morally significant for her thesis, and hence, for anthropology). Heaton Shrestha discusses these emotional repositionings as field “distanciation” and “othering” practices with significant implications on how we construct the field.

It is not until she engages with critical auto-ethnography, feminist anthropology and the ethnography of emotions by Reddy (2002), that she begins to articulate fruitfully her fieldwork experiences, their meanings and the process of their transformation. Similarly, another colleague, Sherryl Kleinman, states: “the structure of academia makes it difficult to do field research adequately, and especially to deal head-on with emotions in the field” (Kleinman, 1991:193)xxx. In Kleinman’s case this denial of field emotion (encouraged by her department) eroded her enthusiasm for her project:

I dared not discuss with colleagues in my department or field-research friends and colleagues across the miles. I think I now understand why. Although not acknowledged in any methods text I know of, an unwritten rule says that
fieldwork should be exciting and enjoyable. My conversations with colleagues who do quantitative research echo this ‘You're so lucky you get to do interesting work.’ This romanticising of fieldwork kept me, and might well keep others, from talking about feelings we fear will disrupt the research process.

Reflecting further on her emotional isolation Kleinman suggests that she found it difficult to talk about her feelings because they were “negative feelings” (disappointment and anger) against the group she was studying, and she felt it was not right to have these. She also experienced the pressure of having to appear an “independent academic” and not show feelings of self-doubt. Finally, she feared appearing untrustworthy and not scientific enough among her colleagues in a quantitative-oriented department.

This emotional repositioning or silencing raises important questions: for example, how we perpetuate its lasting impacts on our research process and how it might lead to poorer quality research. Drawing on Reddy (2002), Heaton Shrestha (2010) says that this suspicion of affect is part of the failing initiatives to train anthropologists to take their emotional responses in fieldwork seriously because such initiatives have to challenge the existing emotional regimes. Indeed, there is a notable lack of training provision that might inform a more productive way forward and give strength to overcome such emotional regimes in individual institutions or the wider discipline of anthropology.

The second example of a doctoral fieldwork is the fascinating auto-ethnography by Curran (2010). It offers an insight into the various levels of emotional reflexivity available to researchers (or not), and the methodological, theoretical and ethical impacts of us choosing to stay on a certain level. Curran conducts fieldwork in a Mental Health NHS Trust in London, working as a nurse. One day, during banter with another nurse, Curran makes a joke, which – instead of making the other male nurse laugh – offends. In his thesis, Curran articulates this situation and his reaction by reflecting back on his teenage socialisation and the workings of the English “joking culture.” He uses the literature on joking relationships in anthropology and his self-reflexivity about growing up in a particular cultural environment. This is indeed satisfying academically and he defends his thesis successfully. However, later, following his training in group psychotherapy, he revisits the “offending” encounter. Equipped with different means for emotional reflexivity by the training, he makes sense of and articulates that fieldwork situation differently. He begins with the question – how did he actually feel at the time? Why did he write about it the way he did? How important was that he felt he was white and the other nurse was black? He uncovers his own difficult emotions, including anger and some very uncomfortable feelings, deeply buried, of inferiority and, possibly – prejudice. This then leads him to a very different interpretation of his fieldwork data and analysis – he engages in a critical reflection on racism in the hospital, on topics such as racial discrimination, power and masculinity.

This example shows how an alternative quality of emotional reflexivity leads the doctoral researcher to see a very different set of issues in his fieldwork, to articulate them in another way and through a different anthropological literature. He was brave enough to explore a vulnerable (cf. Behar 1996) side to himself and he transforms in the process. With his transformation, his relationships, his field, his methodology, theory and ethics transform, and with them, undoubtedly – his contribution to anthropology. As with Heaton Shrestha, John Curran, also looks actively for support on how to make sense of his experiences professionally. Like Heaton Shrestha, he searches in anthropological literature, among peers and staff but the sources and resources he is guided towards, do not allow for a fruitful articulation of his lived experience of data gathering and analysis. Instead, he arrives at his major insight, the key to his fieldwork, outside the discipline of anthropology - during the psychotherapy training – because this was the space where his emotional experience could be discussed. He then takes his deeper understanding back to anthropology, discovering radical empiricism and the work of Michael Jackson, both sources of support, validation and insight, and argues confidently about the indispensable role of emotional reflexivity in anthropology.

Heaton Shrestha shows how she changes her emotional landscape in the process of writing her PhD thesis and the meaning of her data and its interpretation. The defensive approach promoted by her training environment seems to result in a change to an analysis which is questionable, methodologically,
theoretically and ethically. Curran’s example (2010) is about an emotional transformation holding the key to data analysis but initially inaccessible during fieldwork or the writing of his thesis. The lack of initial emotional reflexivity on this occasion may be seen as potentially limiting both field engagement and its understanding; and, thus, it also poses both methodological and ethical questions. Had the researcher not taken a self-development course outside his anthropology learning course, his deeper feelings might have remained undisclosed even to himself and, with this, the key to making sense of his fieldwork may have remained buried.

Both of these examples show how much doctoral work in anthropology is about articulating emotions in the field and how few resources students have at their disposal to achieve this with a certain level of safety, dignity, integrity and wisdom. Both cases suggest clearly that independent of how we get to be emotionally reflexive, we need to add emotional reflexivity to the wider reflexive project of anthropology and, especially, when teaching courses in fieldwork methodology. Developing and demonstrating a capacity for emotional self-reflection, creativity, improvisation, serendipity and intimacy need to be nourished alongside love for the craft, and a sharp questioning attitude about the “politics of significance”. This is central to the training of anthropologists.

Step 5: Developing Pedagogical Strategies for Emotional Reflexivity towards Transformative Learning

In this last section, I point to some potential pedagogical strategies towards transformative learning focusing on the embodied experiences of researchers. We have very limited explicit anthropological pedagogical experience to propose as an alternative to the training requirements of research councils about methodology. Here I draw attention to the importance of: creating an emotionally articulate learning environment; developing experiential teaching and learning methods and training staff how to employ them; focusing on skills that enhance emotional reflexivity in addition to cognitive skills; paying attention to the nature of fieldwork research as a process of relational reflection (which demands emotional reflexivity); paying attention to the different degrees of emotional reflexivity needed by various research questions; considering the moral, methodological and theoretical implications of not being sufficiently emotionally reflexive and exploring the nature of such responsibility; examining the role of supervisory relationships and the role of supervisors; and taking into consideration the individual proclivities of researchers. Taylor (2009) strongly argues that, in the first place, transformative learning has to be informed by a clear theoretical orientation. When we have this in place, that is, when we have a philosophy, theory and principles of anthropological pedagogy (e.g. as a relational, transformative process), what comes next? What pedagogical resources can we employ?

One of the first steps could be the creation of a learning environment where the affective aspects of anthropological research, learning and teaching and emotional reflexivity are taken seriously. One could begin with the preparation of those who teach (especially those who supervise doctoral researchers) and the creation of spaces on official courses where students and staff could work towards understanding the affective aspects of their work and their implications in a supportive, safe and both emotionally and anthropologically articulate environment. Such spaces could be designated courses or peer groups for students and staff. These spaces have to be facilitated professionally in order to avoid turning them into a defensive space rather than a space for articulation of the emotional and its place in methodology and theory. Fieldwork methods courses prior to students departing on fieldwork, or peer groups and ethnographic writing courses for those who have returned from the field are obvious sites to start from. Developing emotional reflexivity is an ongoing process and just one occasional class would not be sufficient to address it. Ideally, it will be integrated throughout fieldwork methods courses. In addition, students could be encouraged to engage in various forms of personal self development where emotional reflexivity is central.

In addition to creating a learning environment that values emotional reflexivity, some experiential pedagogical methods (Bion 1962, Kolb 1984, Baker et al. 2005, Warren et al. 2008) could also be
considered and added to the existing ones we are all familiar with (even if we have not written much about them) - fieldtrips, exhibitions, games, internships, etc. Experiential methods may also create a space for transformative learning through including and articulating the embodied experience of students, together with developing students’ self-awareness about how they learn and how this might form part of their anthropological work. Writing courses (including those in collaborative writing, e.g. Wyatt et al. 2011) or courses in performative auto-ethnography (Spry 1992) may also facilitate the articulation of the emotional in doing fieldwork or writing a thesis. Such pedagogies need to be developed while maintaining a critical understanding of the wider emotional regimes of academia and how emotions may be implicated, for example, in the making of the neo-liberal subject. However, such critique need not dissuade from valuing, making sense of and making visible the practices of knowledge-making, in which we ordinarily engage.

Innovative ways of engaging the lived experience in the process of learning are proposed by Ingold and Lucas (2007). They suggest anthropology is:

not so much the study of people as a way of studying with people […] the novice gradually learns to see things and of course to hear and feel them too, in the ways his or her mentors do[…] it elucidates our perception of the world and opens our eyes to other possibilities of being. And, in bringing these possibilities to bear upon our own experience, we can be led to new discoveries. (p.287)

In their article, the authors take us on an inspiring and rare journey of teaching anthropology in practice by involving experiential methods (the senses, perceptions, the imagination, feeling as well as thinking) and developing an awareness of the important place of supervisor-student relations in the development of fieldwork skills (see also Drackle and Edgar 2004). Many anthropological experiences testify to the need for further discussion on whether the existing methods classes truly prepare the novice artisans for the field and ascertain the continuity and growth of anthropological craftsmanship. If anthropologists are to gain knowledge through embodied experience in the field - what learning experiences prepare them for it? How do we model it for them? What qualities do we encourage in our students? How do we facilitate them acquiring these qualities? What we see as the purpose of anthropology and doing fieldwork is perhaps what will orient us in answering these questions.

In answering these questions, we could start from the premise that anthropological fieldwork as well as teaching and learning anthropology is a process of relational reflection rather than “participant observation” because the anthropologist gains knowledge through reflecting in/on their relatedness in the field. The field itself is not a geographical site but a relational (including embodied, psychological) process and knowledge derived from it, thus, would evolve as far as our capacity for relational reflection and engagement. This is why, drawing on Jackson (1983), Gilbert and Evans (2000) and Jackson (1989) respectively, we could foreground the development of qualities such as: “informed subjectivity,” “capacity for inclusion” and “epistemological openness” towards gaining emotional reflexivity in anthropology. The examples from the previous sections above show clearly the importance of such qualities. They also point to the need for supervisors to employ an ethic of care in working with doctoral students. There should be provision of a supervisory relationship that can create a space for a safe, engaging and inspiring dialogue, where embodied knowing and learning is included. Through this dialogue, emotions in research and learning can be articulated, thus modelling and practicing relational reflection. This places particular requirements for the preparation of teachers in anthropology.

Some important elements of anthropological knowledge could be found or lost, or changed in the course of the affective journey of the anthropologist (before, during and after anthropological fieldwork) depending on the capacity for emotional reflexivity. The more the anthropologist is aware of the relational dynamics (and its meaning) and the emotional landscape of their field, which they both affect and are affected by, and also - the better they are at articulating it - the deeper and more valuable the insights from the field. One does not have to be a feminist or a postmodernist to partake in making anthropological sense of affective fieldwork process; although feminist and postmodernist anthropologists can offer a lot on how to understand the methodological, theoretical or ethical implications of the emotional in our work and
how to articulate them. Every doctoral student in anthropology immersed within an emotional regime that is supportive, and a training program that facilitates emotional reflexivity, can turn their attention to the role of emotions in their knowledge-making.

Provided the right conditions are in place, to what degree students engage in developing their emotional reflexivity on their course, may depend on the requirements of their specific research questions and their field. It may then be key to examine honestly if the research question and the fieldwork they choose match the type of emotional reflexivity they are prepared for and able to employ, or develop prior to fieldwork. This includes learning how we learn and understanding our bodily and psychological proclivities (Luhrmann 2010). Awareness of the latter would allow us firstly, to access a particular field, and secondly, to make sense of it, including all our engagements before, during or after fieldwork, which play a key role in how and what we learn from the field and in general. Certain fields and fieldwork topics may require more analytic attention to one’s embodied, sensed experiences in the field compared with others. I personally think that all topics and fields would benefit from emotional reflexivity but perhaps, on occasion, some research situations may not be crucially defined by whether or how well we include the affective; at least, there may be no major consequences for anyone involved, including the discipline as a whole. But on other occasions, a lot may be at stake depending on whether one chooses (or not) to immerse their embodied self significantly in the field in order to know through its transformations and, then, if one prioritises (or not) emotional reflexivity (as part of relational reflection, rather than a “participant observation”) as a way of knowing.

Given primacy to the body of the anthropologist rather than the acquisition of anthropological discourse or representation and symbolism, is the original key that can open the door to this way of doing, being and knowing in the field (and as Jackson 1989, Okely 2000 and Myers 2008 suggest, it may be the key to many more situations than we suspect). If one chooses not to use this original key, but decides upon another, then alternative door to different knowledge altogether will open – a room full of different data and analysis. If emotionally reflexive, we should have awareness as to the implications of our choice of a key. Such choices may become problematic if we claim to ourselves and to others that we have opened the door that needed the original key when in reality we have not; or if we believe and let others believe that opening the second door has led us to the same room of knowledge as opening the first door. In the case of tango dancing research, whether the anthropologist chooses to learn about gender in tango communities through the lived experience of dancing tango himself or chooses not to learn to dance at all, and never does, will lead respectively to two very different rooms of knowledge. The first one contains the meaning of gender among tango dancers; and the second – the meaning of gender among non-tango-dancing people who hang out with tango dancers – there may be no open door between them. The claim we make as to what we have found in the field, has moral, methodological and theoretical consequences. This is why it is important to foreground “informed subjectivity” (and with it, a “capacity for inclusion”) and epistemological and ontological openness in the training of anthropologists – to facilitate emotional reflexivity and with it - our knowledge-making.

When discussing the consequences and degrees of emotional reflexivity, it is worth drawing on the eloquent argument developed by Luhrmann (2010). Sometimes, the decisive mechanisms as to how we understand the role of our emotions in the field may not be just a result of the academic environment or intellectual orientation:

We are slower to think about anthropologists as having different proclivities, different psychological and bodily capacities, but they are at least as important. We know that those who believe in God and those who do not may write differently about religious practice—but we have been slower to recognize that those who have vivid imaginations, perhaps those who have had a hallucination, may attend to different features of religious experience, whatever beliefs they hold.

Which is fine. But just as we acknowledge that we should admit to our own beliefs when writing about belief, or at least recognize the possible impact of those beliefs, we should acknowledge that our own proclivities could be impediment or advantage when writing about certain topics. (pp.233-234)
If not acknowledged, our bodily and psychological proclivities may sometimes be misrecognised simply as differences in theoretical, intellectual orientation or cultural background. Our bodies and psychological proclivities are entwined with the latter but they are not the same. Saying that one is a woman or a man of a particular ethnic background and from a specific school in anthropology is not necessarily sufficient to explain our final analysis from our fieldwork, or why some anthropologists are inclined to employ a particular degree of emotional reflexivity or none at all. Then, should everyone be encouraged to go into fields that require significant depth of emotional reflexivity? As Luhrmann goes on to argue:

If psychological and bodily proclivities make a difference to the way people use and understand cultural models, it is to the advantage of the anthropologists to understand their own proclivities and the way those proclivities may shape the way they learn about culture in the field. Otherwise they run the risk of sounding foolish, like someone who doesn’t remember his dreams and treats cultural models of dream interpretation as metaphors, or someone who doesn’t realize that hallucinations are uncommon and treats all reports of unusual experience as descriptions of the world as it is. (p. 234)

... The more you know about yourself, the way you learn and the way those tendencies are distributed among human beings, the more wisely you will gauge the way your own experience will inform you about the experience of others and about what and how they learn. But it is always worthwhile to pay attention to your experience. (p. 235)

Conclusion

All of these steps in teaching and learning anthropology form an essential part of the transformative learning that anthropology could be. The emotional has been continuously undermined by powerful scientific hegemonies, supporting the hierarchical distinctions between the social and natural sciences and between different methodologies within social science research. A lot is at stake, especially for anthropologists who aim for transformative learning in the face of a growing “audit” culture (Shore and Wright 2000, Strathern 2000). As Michael Herzfeld evocatively describes it (2007:93-94), the rise of the positivistic vision of knowledge has been accompanied by a brutal elision of embodied forms of knowledge. The anthropologists who question the imposed positivistic measures of knowledge are like those Cretan artisans, described by Herzfeld (p. 107), who resist standardisation and place “experience” above “replicability.” Anthropologists as artisans are indeed engaged in the production of embodied knowledge (even when not acknowledged) through lived experience and intimate social involvement. Unlike what appears at first sight (to some) to be the proponents of the “dispassionate precision of modern science”; anthropologists are the “principal instruments of their own observations, analysis and comparisons” (p. 101), and these are affective and affecting instruments. Our emotions pertain to the specific emotional regimes of academia - they are universal human capacities that can be differently realized, understood, expressed, repressed, structured, symbolized and socialized in different socio-cultural contexts.

In this sense, how we allow ourselves to experience and reflect on lived fieldwork experience, that is, how we learn as embodied beings and how we articulate it, is the key to what we come to know and how we teach. While we may have to be extremely careful not to convert emotions into another tool of hyper-accounting of academic practices by rampant neo-liberalism, our starting point may be to provide more formal forums for discussion, and a mainstream attention to articulating the emotional. By adding emotional reflexivity to the wider reflexive project of anthropology, we may show more confidently that emotions actually lead to analytical insight as well as to a transformative experience. They might motivate, facilitate and sustain our changes in being, doing and knowing. Emotions could allow us to find a better research question; to sense social practices or to better grasp their meaning. They could also lead us to deeper and more meaningful understanding our embodied involvement with people in the field, as well as with our methods. They could illuminate our proclivities or resistances and their role in knowledge-making, and in the sensed meaning that others convey to us. In this context, by developing relational epistemologies relying on embodied as well as other types of knowledge, we
partake in the affective turn, which challenges the new waves of positivism. Taking emotions seriously and acknowledging that we rely on them to know, teach and learn, does not mean that we should focus on ourselves, become confessional, or anecdotal. Rather, as Okely (1992:20) argues – what is deemed epistemologically relevant should be only what furthers our primary socio-cultural investigative task. And, as I have argued here, emotional reflexivity may be the key in revealing the potential of anthropology as transformative learning.

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Notes

1 Earlier versions of this paper include a working paper for the Cultural Dynamics and Emotions Network (http://www.qub.ac.uk/cden/) and a conference paper presented at Teaching Anthropology Today, 9-10 October 2008, Keble College, University of Oxford, where the idea to establish this Journal originated (several other papers from Volume 1, Issue 1 and 2 (2011) of Teaching Anthropology were presented at the same conference).
2 The same statement about learning can also be made about, say, learning biology. And yet, most anthropologists would agree that there is something particular about becoming an anthropologist and that there are some common pedagogical strategies across various anthropological fields and institutional sites of teaching and learning. At the same time, despite the globalization of knowledge and the discipline, and the disciplinarian culture of anthropology, we cannot regard anthropology as having the same signatory pedagogy throughout the world or throughout all universities in the same country, or even in the same department. Furthermore, anthropological pedagogies have evolved with time – the transformations of the discipline have been entwined with the dynamics of specific contexts such as educational policies, or social, economic and political agendas refracted by learners’ subjectivities in each generation.
3 As Marcus (2009) summarises, some key common pedagogical strategies (described for the context of the US but valid also elsewhere) for teaching anthropological fieldwork have so far included:
1. Socialization of students into the circulation of informal stories about fieldwork (e.g. stories told over dinner), rather than providing formal spaces for the discussion of methods;
2. Reading exemplary ethnographies, which may reproduce dated conventions about what fieldwork is and does and how to write about it;
3. Keeping data sets and data collection as private affair, which does not correspond to some contemporary changes in the way we manage research;
4. The expected derailment of original research plans – but perhaps more preparation in methodology may avoid such derailment and its popular expectation;

5. “Double agent-cy” – when anthropologists are socialised into describing their methods for non-anthropologists by translating them into the discourse of the “consumer” rather than explicating them (e.g. the difference of what anthropologists do and what they say in funding proposals that they do).

As the remaining authors in the same volume (Faubion and Marcus 2009) have also noted, these pedagogical features (endearing as they may be because they continue to provide a felt sense of mutuality in the anthropological “community”) reproduce a significant amount of mystification about what anthropologists actually do and how they learn to do it. Such features are also insufficient to prepare students to conduct fieldwork and do not allow anyone to understand where the authority of the discipline comes from. If, at the end of their education, students become “anthropologists,” it almost seems as if it has happened “by chance.” In addition, such pedagogy of mystification does not prepare anthropologists sufficiently for the contemporary world, and even worse – it does not satisfy the current expectations, goals and interests of students themselves (see the UK context described by Coleman and Simpson 2004). Thus, any potential transformation through learning fieldwork in the existing ways may be distancing students from achieving their aspirations in and outside academia.

Indeed, not only with regards to fieldwork, but also more generally, there has been little systematic research of anthropological pedagogy, especially in Europe, and specifically in the UK. This observation has been reported and discussed eloquently in the volumes published by the Teaching Anthropology Network of the European Association of Social Anthropologists (EASA) – Learning Fields (edited by Dracle and Edgar 2004), and particularly by Mills et al. (2004) and also, in the last issue of this journal by Mills (2011). Such discussion has opened a long-awaited space for engaging with teaching and learning through anthropologies of higher education policy, practice and politics, mediated learning and experiential learning. Similarly, in the US, this historic and ongoing lack of pedagogical discussion in anthropology has been noted more recently by Faubion and Marcus (2009) and their proposal for a pedagogy of anthropology as a process of design is inspiring (Fortun 2009). The discussion about the lack of research and analysis of the teaching and learning of anthropological pedagogy until now has focused insightfully on institutional developments within the discipline; on the predominant “research” rather than teaching orientation of anthropologists; and, on certain beliefs or attitudes about the classroom as a site of anthropological production and higher education policies and practices (e.g. Mills et al. 2004, Mills 2011). An additional reason that might have prevented anthropologists from exploring their own teaching anthropologically may lie in the particular way of understanding (or rather, the lack of understanding) of emotional reflexivity and lived experience in the process of making and sharing anthropological knowledge.

Two principle orientations in teaching anthropology, recorded for the UK context by Mascarenhas-Keyes and Wright (1995), have also been noted and discussed in earlier periods of anthropology and for different contexts (e.g. Mandelbaum et al. 1963). These refer to either an inclination to teach “content,” or to aim for developing personal and professional qualities in future anthropologists. Mascarenhas-Keyes and Wright refer to these (in undergraduate teaching) as respectively, “substantivist” and “imaginist” approaches to teaching. While the first one is preoccupied mainly with delivering ethnographic material and theory (it is often materialised in classic lectures and seminars where students are supposed to acquire knowledge about various ethnographic case-studies, key concepts and their theoretical analysis), the second one is focussed mostly on developing an anthropological way of seeing the world.

I see some resonance between their call and that of some educational researchers such as Fink (2003), who argue that that we need to move from content-centered approaches to learning-centered approaches.

As Taylor (2009) discusses, there have been two main theoretical strands in transformative learning. The first one (e.g. Mezirow 1978, Kegan 1994, Dirkx 2000) dwells on the individual as the main unit of analysis and pay little attention to broader context and social change. The second one, a social-emancipatory one, is very much inspired by the work of Freire (1970, 1997). It explores personal and social transformation as intertwined and, hence, it employs the concepts of power and agency in understanding how people can change both their own reality and society, thus, it forms part of an ideological critique (Taylor 2009: 5). This latter orientation is particularly suited to making explicit the often implicit or hidden agendas of anthropologists - to transform the world through their involvement in research and writing. As anthropologists, we are aware that individuals do not exist in isolation of the collective and that subjectivities are formed and transformed together with their socio-political environment. In this context, by paying attention to the potential transformation in classroom interactions and individual student experiences, we could create a space also for elements of a “radical pedagogy” (Freire 1970, 1997, Giroux 1997). While Freire has made some specific suggestions in how to apply the principles of “radical pedagogy” in practice, the work of Giroux provides more of a theoretical framework. In general, critical pedagogy has been criticized precisely as failing to show how to link theory with daily teaching practice (see e.g. Gore 1993).

The authors refer to a change of being (including the affective) and not only to a change of the way of thinking.

For an insightful discussion on difficult experiences in fieldwork, see Hume and Mulcock (2004).

Although anthropologists have themselves been their own research tools since the inception of the fieldwork methodology, it has not been clear how exactly we make knowledge out of personal experience, and, it was not until the 1970s when anthropologists became interested in both experiencing and observing their own and others' co-participation in the ethnographic encounter (Tedlock 1991: 69). Even today, this is not yet a mainstream concern.

My interest in the topic comes from my own experience. My two long-term fieldwork experiences (one in the Balkans and one in Nigeria) were emotionally rich. Yet at the time (1998-2004), I had little theoretical, methodological or personal preparation to articulate them and make use of them to their full potential. In 2001, when I happened to be involved in both field-sites at the same time, a colleague, Maruska Svašek asked me to prepare a book chapter about emotions in my fieldwork, and, at first, I immediately refused. I was rather disappointed at being asked to write on such an “insignificant and
rather academically dubious topic” (as I thought it to be at the time). Today, I understand well those who are skeptical the way I was. Even when I was finally persuaded, I did not realize that this was the beginning of a very significant journey – a personal and professional transformation. This journey involved a re-discovery of both myself and anthropology, including an epistemological and ontological transformation, which I did not anticipate and could not even have imagined at the time. The chapter I wrote then (published a few years later), signified only an initial (from the point of view of where I am now) step. That my own emotions in the field were significant too, was an insight I only came across later – and despite the existing work in anthropology and in my department on this topic – it did not happen until I embarked on psychotherapy training (since 2004), hoping initially to understand emotions in my fieldwork better. The main trigger and motivation came from my own research, learning, and later – teaching, experiences. This led me to new questions, to new ways of seeing, doing, knowing and being, and also - to discover anthropology and anthropologists, which I had not come across earlier, or at least not from a place from which I could have had a meaningful dialogue with them. So, I really understand the skeptics - I was one of them. Today, I wish I had known at least some of all this prior to my fieldwork. In my case, if I had, I would have, for example, been able to sense, see, contain, respect, understand and articulate better my fieldwork engagements and experience together with the collective trans-generational trauma in both my fieldwork sites – the key to understanding the daily life of the political, of the State, there. My interest in emotions in research today comes from this journey, including, since 2004 – my teaching anthropology to undergraduates, and, since 2006 - to postgraduates. It has been a privilege to facilitate the transformative anthropological journeys of my students, always involving affect. I have also been keen to think about emotions in teaching and learning in the course of my research on my own teaching throughout the “Diploma in Teaching in Higher Education” at Oxford (2010 - 2011). My current research project (funded by Vitae Innovate) on pedagogy, learning and affect among doctoral students in interdisciplinary science has also been inspirational, especially in comparing affective learning in the sciences and social sciences. With my growing emotional reflexivity through the years, I feel that my research, learning and teaching grow too. I am not saying that one needs psychotherapy training to begin to make sense of and then conceptualise the State as an affective process or to understand the affective intricacies of anthropological fieldwork as an embodied lived experience (although many anthropologists have found psychotherapy useful and important). Independent of how it is achieved, emotional reflexivity is important. I am indebted to Marusa Svasek for the invitation from where my journey began.

\[xii\] This situation has its own history – see, for example, Shore (1999) who, refers evocatively to the reluctance of talking about fieldwork experience in British anthropology as a “…conspiracy of silence” in training anthropologists. In education research, it is mainly the proponents of “transformative learning” (mainly in adult education) who have been concerned with affective processes and, in particular with their transformational capacity (e.g. see Taylor 2009, Dirks 2000). Otherwise, until recently, with exceptions (Dewey 1938, Kemper 1978), like anthropology, education research has mainly shied away from the systematic or mainstream study of emotions, especially in higher education (Beard et al. 2007). And, again like anthropology, recently, some publications have begun to assert more confidently that emotions play a significant part in the learning experience and to a large extent mediate the process of learning (e.g. Schutz and Pekrun 2007, Tennant 2006, Brockbank and McGill 1998, Dirks 2001, Barbalet 2002). Certain authors have seen emotions as evidence of the engagement of the whole person in learning (Clayton et al. 2009, Fink 2003) and this makes it imperative that we open spaces to articulate the affective aspects of learning (Christie et al. 2008). With the rise of this research, critical voices have suspected the focus on emotions as a sign of a growing “therapy culture” (Furedi 2003, Colley 2003, Ecclestone 2004, Ecclestone and Hayes 2009) and it is important to take some of their suggestions on board.

\[xiii\] For more details, see Spencer and Davies (2010) and Davies and Spencer (2010). As much as emotions have been means of belonging, ranking, “othering,” including, challenging, protecting, including, supporting, or (de)legitimising those we research, they have played the same role for the researchers (of either gender) themselves. The two volumes – *Emotions in the Field* (edited by Davies and Spencer 2010) and *Anthropological Fieldwork: a Relational Process* (edited by Spencer and Davies 2010) have offered sufficient evidence that the emotional pertains to the who research process - including the researcher, be it a man or a woman, white or not, Western or not. This is to say, no matter who writes for or against them, they are always there and we might as well pay attention to them and search for their analytical value. In these two volumes, we have been reluctant to define “emotion” in any proscriptive way that would presuppose the analytical separation between so-called “aspects of self.” The result of this has been to open rather than close possibilities, by allowing researchers to think about the “emotional” in novel ways. We have aimed to distinguish between the confession of emotions from emotions as a means of gaining (anthropological) knowledge and rather than focusing on whether we can know the other or ourselves through emotion, we have explored how we participate in each other’s emotions. Vincent Crapanzano (personal communication, see also Crapanzano, 1992) suggests: “it is less interesting to pose questions about knowing the emotion of the other or our own, but instead, it is important to pose questions about how we participate in each other’s emotions… in an emotional surround – in which we may exalt or disappear or succumb or disengage. It’s near impossible to see/conceptualise ourselves in the in-between experience. Objectification pushes us towards possession, pre-possessiveness, and possessive attribution and self-attrition.” Furthermore, by avoiding the codification of emotion through the avoidance of tight definition, we have allowed for faithfulness to the radical empirical approach, which refuses to essentialise the emotional as a product of self, or as a separate “component” of personality. One might suppose that our use of the term “emotion” is thus somewhat unnecessary, and that we might have been better served by the term “experience” (see the discussion problematising “experience,” e.g. Desjarlais 1994, 1997; also Desjarlais and Throop 2011). By stressing the emotional, one might argue, as we have (to a certain extent) reproduced a familiar dichotomy between thinking and feeling. But this accusation only stands if we are misunderstood as using this term only in a traditional sense. Rather, we have been at pains to emphasise that we see the emotional as inseparable from other domains of existence – it flows in and through all
aspects of human and social experience, affecting and being affected by them. We emphasize it separately precisely to show that it cannot be separate. At the same time, all contributors to these two volumes have aimed to bring emotion decidedly within the analytic domain, by subjecting it to radical empirical reflection. Thus, as discussed also in Spencer (2010) we have shown how emotions are both cognitive and physical, both discourses and embodied experiences, both individual and collective (cf. Casey and Edgerton 2005, Lindholm 2005, Svašek 2006): emotions arise within a relational domain, and thus become mechanisms, keys, vehicles, or ways with which we may, through analysis of their meaning in our lived relational engagements, better grasp, orient ourselves in, question, sense and embody, the “taken-for-granted” or, as Malinowski put it, “the imponderabilia of everyday life.” Furthermore, while anthropologists traditionally undertook fieldwork in ideally crowded and bounded fields, we have also begun to discuss how our emotions can enable our engagement with what might at first sight appear the silent, empty, fragmented or illegible fields (e.g. Hastrup 2010, Luhrmann 2010, Cook 2010, Shuen-Der 2010, Lorimer 2010). xiv See Luhrmann (1989, 2010), Davies (2009) who discuss this in other settings such as training in, respectively, witchcraft, religious practice and psychotherapy.

xiv The long and rich history of research into emotions is far too comprehensive to do justice to here, see instead Davies and Spencer (2010) and Spencer and Davies (2010) for a more recent account. There have been, however, many recent and successful attempts to summarise and collate this research – attempts which rather than focusing on “emotions in fieldwork” focus on the category or phenomenon of emotion itself. For example, in anthropology, see Casey and Edgerton (2005), also Wulff (2007) who has prepared a Cultural Reader on emotions, also Svašek (2005, 2006), Svašek and Skrbiš (2008), Beatty (2004), and Lutz and White (1986). As Fischer and Manstead (1995) describe it, even though we are more than 100 years away from William James’s seminal essay on the emotions (published 1884), not only are physiologists and psychologists still engaged in debating the questions posed in that paper, but the social sciences and more recently neuroscience have shed new light on old debates. These discussions broadly focus on a few common disputes: are the visceral changes that accompany emotional experiences the cause or the result of emotional experience? Are emotions universal or culturally constructed phenomena, or does the answer lie somewhere in between? What is the role of cognition and emotion in the interpretation of external and internal events? Is empathy a false tool lulling us to believe that we can know what is felt, or does it allow access to what may otherwise remain inaccessible? While it is clear that much recent psychological and physiological literature on the emotions focuses on inner, subjective experience and labeling, as anthropologists we recognize that people from other cultures may not have a word for emotion, or may have radically different ideas about the location and meaning of emotion, emotional expression, perception, experience, and the antecedents and physiology of emotion. But these points should not dissuade field researchers from taking the epistemological relevance of their own emotions seriously.

xv Including some more recent examples such as Gould’s work (2003) on the role of emotions in social movements.

xvi See also Kleinman and Capp (1993).

xvii I only briefly sketch it here. Despite the work of many scholars (such as e.g. Jagger 1989, Behar 1996) who demonstrate powerfully how the relational and/or emotional leads to understanding, emotion as a form of knowing has often been challenged in the context of power inequalities between researchers, subject and object, and between male and female in the academic space and beyond. While feminist scholars opened an arena in which emotion could be more freely discussed, this space itself ended up being “feminised” and thus marginalised by being associated (by their opponents) with their own marginal position. If such research was marginalised for the themes it pursued, it was also marginalised for the choice of idiom through which these themes were often communicated. Initially, the spaces allocated, but also often voluntarily accepted by women, through which to write and publish, were often perceived as “unserious” or “unscientific” genres: autobiographies, personal accounts, or memoirs and letters and various other confessional. Barbara Tedlock (1995: 278) describes this by quoting Martha Ward’s self-conscious description of her memoirs as “unworthy for my peers or professional colleagues”. It is what John van Maanen calls an ‘impressionist talk’.” At the same time, it is important to note that even the memoirs of male anthropologists have been the repository of emotional experiences in the field while their academic publications have been cleansed of any traces of affect and presented as paragons of rationality and linearity. As Dubois (1995) also reminds us (citing Mary Morris), many women have travelled disguised as men and their voices have been formed by male voices, which has framed the experience of travel and by extension of fieldwork in a particular way too: as a male venture. It might be interesting to ask what might be the contemporary parallels to such choices of the past, that is, how might women continue to disguise themselves as men during fieldwork? Here, the “open” and “vulnerable” is subtly kept within the sphere of the “private” and female, while the “stoic” and “analytical” is kept decidedly within the “public” and male.

xviii Other important contributions, not necessarily focusing on the researcher, are, for example, Appadurai’s (1990) work on emotions as intrinsic in the relations between inferiors and superiors; White’s (1990) contribution on emotions as framing discussions and power relations and, later, his “emotive institutions” (White 2005); Ewing’s (2005) discussion and expansion of Raymond Williams’s “structures of feelings,” Lyon and Barbalet’s (1994) work on embodiment as political process; Arnezaga’s (2003) “maddening states;” Navaro-Yashin’s “sensing the political” (2008); and Heatherington (2005) on emotional aspects of political protest (e.g. emotions as bridging the individual and the social and thus the political) – a point made also by Leavitt (1996), Overing and Passess (2000), Milton and Svašek (2005), Svašek (2006), Okely (2007) and Bielh et al. (2009).

xix Different scholars in sociology (Reay 2005), critical theory (Clough and Halley 2007), race and cultural studies (e.g. Ahmed’s 2001:11 - “surfacing of individual, national and global bodies through the mediation of affect” and “the cultural politics of emotion” in Ahmed 2004), and psychology debating the political have also inspired discussion in the
anthropology of emotion. For example, despite some of its limitations, sociologist Theodore Kemper’s (1989) concern with the importance of context in emotions could be one possible beginning for critical cross-disciplinary dialogue and discussion in the investigation of whether and how emotions are “subject to” political relations. For example, many of our emotional experiences might be stimulated by specific experiences of power and status. Thus where we are positioned in the structures of power relations might influence the configurations of emotions experienced. Might social disempowerment bring anger or depression; might social culpability bring guilt? Could we argue that when entering new relations of power in the field, these might also compell certain emotional effects? When we become subject to new forms of power relations, could we feel this in the emotional domain? Another sociologist, Jack Barbalet (2002: 4), writes: “Emotion is provoked by circumstance and is experienced as transformation of dispositions to act. It is through the subject’s active exchange with others that emotional experience is both stimulated in the actor and orienting of their conduct.” How could and should we, anthropologists, engage with such thinking in terms of our fieldwork experiences? Could we really study all these phenomena in any other way than the experiential? Exploring critically a number of sociological and psychological approaches to emotion, White (2005:245) concludes that they all point to the utility of the ethnography of emotions, and I would add – also to the utility of the ethnography of the fieldworker’s emotions, as they might reveal subtle links between knowing and the political. Indeed, high professional standards must oblige us to scrutinise not only our research practices and relationships, but also complacent separations and marginalisations that sustain dominant rationalist, statist, gender, sexual, racist, nationalist as well as other political ideologies. Here, we could also draw upon the recent broader developments in critical theory, sociology, women’s studies and cultural studies, which have all initiated, as Clough (2007) has stated, an “affective turn.” The “affective turn” has aimed, among other things, to analyse power relations, which cross regional, state, national, economic, public and private spheres and international organisations (p. 2). As Michael Hardt (2007) describes in the foreword to the above volume, this “affective turn” has its foundations in academic work on the body and on the emotions. As Hardt underlines, the turn towards “affect” has further problematised traditional dichotomies: affects refer to both body and mind and involve both reason and passions. They are also both causes and effects, and thus illuminate our tendencies to both affect the world and be affected by it. By joining this “affective turn” in one way or another, anthropology may open new interdisciplinary interfaces not only with cultural studies, feminist studies and queer theory, but also with art, philosophy, cognitive science, neuroscience, psychology, psychoanalysis and psychotherapy, and science and technology studies. We could also draw on the insights of earlier postcolonial studies on subjectivity and emotion (see Fanon 1963, 1967) as well as on recent postcolonial critique and particularly Bhabha’s “anxious identifications” (1994) Casey’s "affective citizenship” (2008) and Stoller’s "embodied colonial memories” (1995). The recent advances in psychological anthropology ascribe primacy to the lived experience of the relational and power - such as in the volume edited by Casey and Edgerton (2005) - in particular, the chapters by White (2005) and Ewing (2005). As Casey and Edgerton argue (p. 10-11): “‘alternative,’ ‘parallel,’ and ‘multiple’ modernities require a self-fashioning of what is considered modern across relational experiences.” In response, psycho-cultural studies have furthered the understanding of “the saliency, forms and impact of modern persons and communal forms,” including the workings of power. Psycho-cultural scholars have developed the approach of “person-centered ethnography” where power relations are not explored through reliance on “abstract, experience-distant constructs” but from the point of view of “the acting, intending and attentive subject” (Holland 2001: 49 cited in Casey and Edgerton, 2005:8).  


xvii Spencer and Davies (2010) and Davies and Spencer (2010). 

xviii Some of them might be linked to unconscious defences such as repression and splitting, for example, discussed in psychoanalysis but also in other fields of psychological research and therapy practice. Considering such unconscious defences and the potential contributions from psychoanalysis should be with the following question in mind: how thinking through psychological defences may create rather than simply describe an experience as constructed by one cultural model - the psychoanalytic one? Fitting experience in a psychoanalytic frame is one among many possible ways to talk about these experiences. Here, such talk serves the aim of enhancing the point about the role of what might be referred to as psychological processes in the way we relate to our methods. See also Jackson (2010) who discusses the relationship between the use of psychology by anthropologists and the local epistemologies in the process of making sense of experience. Braddock (2010) offers a very insightful way of employing psychoanalytic concepts to understanding fieldwork experience and knowing through emotions. 

xix We do not need to underestimate some of the relevance of such advice especially in relation to practical measures in organising safety in fieldwork. 

xx See also the insightful discussions on difficult emotions in the field in Hume and Mulcock (2004). 

xxi Perhaps the first time such practices were publicly discussed was when Malinowski’s diary was published, which revealed a rather significant compartmentalisation between “the personal” and “the professional”; a different way of thinking about it may be spatial/psychological cleavages which may be implied in Geertz’s discussion of “being there” and “being here” (as cited in Stoller 2007:175); Dumont (1978) provides an evocative documentation of this split also bringing into attention the female/male aspect of it; such practices are insightfully discussed by Okely (1992); and also in Kleinman and Copp (1993) and Heald and Deluz (1994), among many others; see also Svasek (2005 and 2006). 

xii Of course, sometimes, it is not problematic. The question is, when we do it, can we choose? 

xiiι I draw here on Navarro-Yashin’s (2002) discussion of the Lacanian “fantasy” – she discusses it in relation to statist fantasies – a different context but it is also useful for us to think with about the academic context. Fantasy as she summarises it is a psychic symptom that continues to exert power over one’s life even though the person may have gained
awareness that this is just a fantasy. The reason for such lasting attachment to a fantasy is that it becomes central to the identity of the person.

E.g. how to include emotions in writing without becoming confessional, cf. Herzfeld (2007:98), who argues that ethnographic writing has as much aesthetic as scholarly quality and that the anthropologist’s answer to statistical validity lies in “the cumulative - and therefore in some sense statistical – intensity and intimacy of their encounters.” Further on how to write intersubjectively, see the proposed return to narrative in Michael Jackson (1998: 36): “recounting in detail the lived truth of an event may convey less data with less jargon than the scientific treatise, but what it sacrifices in impressiveness and authority it may recover in immediacy, economy and craft. The minimalisation of ethnographic fact is not, therefore, evidence of a disenchantment with the empirical but rather an attempt to radicalize empiricism by emphasizing verisimilitude and contingency over system and structure.” That certainly demands specific writing and story-telling skills but also perhaps a particular ontology and epistemology.

xxxvii Here, further research might explore the developmental connections between the cultural, the social and the individual as in the recent advances of research into socialisation (Poole 1994). Many anthropologists have argued that undergraduate fieldwork in anthropology is not recommended as students may lack the maturity that an intimate engagement with people’s suffering, joys or existential struggles in the field entails. However, epistemological assumptions and practices are not just a matter of developmental but also of institutional socialisation.

xxxviii Another example is the experience of Woodthorpe (2007).


xxxi Herzfeld (2007:93) argues that, today, anthropologists must respond to the “know-nothing” advocates by continuing the serendipitous affective learning of anthropology students as an “act of resistance to the uncritical uses of epistemic authority.” However, this must not be read as a call to continue the mystification of the true nature of anthropological labour. Without falling into the traps of accountability and the seduction of replicating our methods, we ought to gain and demonstrate confidence in our intellectual resistance. The question here is, as phrased succinctly by Harris (2007:8): “how to give adequate expression to the tacit in a recognizable form of anthropological theory?” One way ahead, I would argue, is to develop sensibility to how we come to know through reflective emotional engagement, and how to communicate it to others. This should be a task for every young anthropologist even if we do not explicitly intend to write about it. Simultaneously, the time is ripe to state straightforwardly what we really do rather than what we would like others to think we do, and to support what we do with methodological advances on the relational, embodied nature of our work. Many anthropologists have demonstrated this point implicitly or explicitly. For more detail see Spencer and Davies (2010) and Davies and Spencer (2010). Here I should also remind of e.g. Dumont (1978), Okely and Callaway (1992), Wikan (1992), Jonas and Gilje (2003), Casey and Edgeberton (2005), Svašek (2005), de Neve and Unnithan-Kumar (2006), Harris (2007), Wulff (2007); and especially Jackson (1998) on the intersubjectivity in anthropological work; also “ways of knowing” in Harris (2007) “intended to foreground the situated and relational character of knowledge,” which is demonstrated in all chapters in their volume; and also the notion of “carnal hermeneutics” in Papagaroufali (2008: 115-121) in the description of interpretation as “a sensory and emotional engagement with the world” where the “…multisensory production of meanings proves to be always taking place in time-bound intersubjective milieus […] with whom [we] might share, negative or positive sensory-emotional relations” (p.116) among many others.

xxxv According to Taylor (2009), then, the practice of transformative learning has to include the following key elements: a dialogue, a critical reflection, holistic approaches to learning, awareness of context, authentic relationships and focusing on individual experience in learning (rather than content). While anthropological pedagogy has proven its strengths in promoting critical thinking and awareness of context through focusing on skills of deconstructing various socially constructed practices and relativising the taken-for-granted, there is yet a lot of work to be done (as the examples above indicate) with regards to:

- engaging the individual experience in the learning of new ways of being, knowing and doing, for example by aligning the vision of teaching anthropology with the teaching activities and learning outcomes;
- using holistic approaches to learning where affective learning is formally included;
- authentic engagement – where students and teachers could feel at ease with discussing openly the affective as part of the subjective, the methodological and the theoretical;
- dialogue – there are still no formal spaces on anthropology degrees to discuss emotions and fieldwork.

These principles may take some time and effort to translate into practice and they need qualified facilitators. Furthermore, the theoretical approach of transformative learning certainly has some unresolved problems of its own, discussed, for example, in Taylor (2009). One of them, that I find particularly relevant in my teaching practice is understanding better the role of the teacher within this framework – if we are not to be directive, can we yet be “authentic” (holding on to our own values), how could we then negotiate the facilitative style and the values of self-directed learning with the hidden agenda of transforming students in particular ways (e.g. what we believe to make a good anthropologist) and, even, initiating social change through this (cf. Taylor 2009) – if this is what we explicitly or implicitly strive towards? An additional issue follows from this one – how to achieve transformative teaching and learning in practice and how to know the features and effects of transformation. An added challenge comes from the need to acknowledge publicly that what we mean by “knowledge” includes also emotions and to learn how to garner such knowledge and how to articulate it (e.g. see Lortimer 2010).

E.g. this volume has a section on Experiential Learning, with chapters by Dracle, Edgar, Russell, Tesarci and Ramnarine.

xxxvi Here Jackson (1983: 340) refers to Devereux (1967:xvi-xvii) to stress the importance of achieving both bodily and psychological awareness of one’s subjectivity – the “royal road to objectivity.”
Gilbert and Evans (2000:10-14) refer to the quality of being able to be in the relationship while simultaneously reflecting on it (some of underlying understanding draws also on Buber 1996).

One question (going beyond the safety issues in fieldwork) – should supervisors encourage or discourage their students to take on a particular research topic, or use particular methods, or even go to a particular field – for example, to a field where acute social or political trauma may affect the student (and thus, the knowledge they make) profoundly without even them being fully aware of this happening. Is it the supervisor’s responsibility to be aware of and anticipate such issues?

An example comes to mind. I came across an article about a colleague’s fieldwork among tango dancers. She studied gender relations in the tango dancing “community.” The anthropologist argued that avoiding dancing herself and never dancing but just hanging out within the dancing spaces and with the dancers has offered an invaluable method in gaining insight into gender relations. Indeed, in the article, there were some interesting and engaging findings about the construction of gendered relations and social networks within the tango community in that city. If I had not danced tango myself, I would have found the article convincing and satisfying. However, I have danced tango. As I was unable to remove my anthropological hat when dancing, I had thought about possible ways to research how people relate to each other in the local tango community. I would argue that it is not possible to understand fully (if at all) the construction of gender and social networks among tango dancers without immersing in the dancing itself and understanding its hold on the “community” through the body. What occurs on the dance floor (and a lot of embodied relatedness and meaning making occurs there, which may be invisible to non-dancers), between the bodies in the dancing couple and between them and the other dancing couples, while shaped by the non-dancing moments and spaces to a certain degree, is itself what actually gives flesh, life, meaning, shape and energy to the social relations between the dancers outside the dance floor. How the feminine and the masculine emerge and how they are felt, made sense of and evolve in and between the dancing bodies in the dance is key. Some of this can be picked from conversations with dancers and observation from aside but there is a particular meaning, which cannot be seen or understood if one has not experienced it herself. Without that bodily knowledge, the attention of the anthropologist may go in a different direction, the questions we formulate may not be good enough, or they may not even be the “right” questions.


See footnote xxxix above.